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Introduction
The Academy filed a copyright infringement suit
against Creative House after it had offered for sale
the Star Award, a statuette similar to the Acad-
emy's "Oscar." The Ninth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court and ruled that no general publication of
the Oscar had taken place and that it was entitled
to protection under the Copyright Act of 1976. In
addition, the Ninth Circuit found violations of the
Lanham Act, California unfair competition laws,
and the California anti-dilution statute.
Facts
The Academy claimed common law copyright pro-
tection for the Oscar from 1929 through 1941. The
Oscar was registered with the United States Copy-
right Office in 1941 and all Oscars since then have
contained statutory copyright notices. After 1941,
the Academy restricted the manner in which win-
ners could advertise their Oscar and gave the Acad-
emy the right of first refusal on the sale of any
Oscar. In 1976, Creative House produced the Star
Award. Physically, the only differences between it
and the Oscar are that the Star Award is two inches
shorter and inlcudes a star rather than a sword.
The Star award was produced for sale to other
corporate buyers.
The Academy filed suit under federal law for copy-
right infringement and violation of the Lanham
Act, and under California law for unfair competi-
tion and trademark dilution. The district court
denied all of the Academy's claims, reasoning that
a general publication of the Oscar had occurred
prior to the 1976 Copyright Act's effective date
which triggered a loss of the common law copyright,
there was no likelihood of confusion of the awards
under federal trademark law, and the Star had not
diluted the Oscar's quality under California law.
Legal Analysis
The Court first addressed whether the "Oscar"
should be afforded federal protection under the
Copyright Act of 1976. Under the Copyright Act,
protection is afforded to a work if it has not become
part of the public domain prior to the Act's effective
date.1 The court agreed with the Academy that the
copyright registration of 1941 for the Oscar as an
unpublished work of art created a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the Oscar was an unpublished work
and that Creative House bore the burden of show-
ing that the Oscar had entered the public domain.2
Merely displaying the Oscar to the public does not
divest the award of common law copyright protec-
tion.3 However, Creative House argued that the
distribution of the Oscar between 1929 and 1941,
without any restrictions on its use or sale,
amounted to a general publication.4 The Academy
contended that this distribution was merely a lim-
ited publication.5
According to the Supreme Court in White v. Kim-
mel, a limited publication occurs when distribution
is both to a definitely selected group and for a
limited purpose without the right of further repro-
duction, distribution, or sale.6 The district court
concluded, and this court agreed, that the Oscar is
awarded only to a select group ofpersons.7 Adistri-
bution does not occur simply because winners are
allowed to advertise the fact that they won the
award or display pictures of it.8 Also, the Academy
does not promote the Oscar for its own commercial
benefit. Therefore, the Academy's purpose is a lim-
ited one to advance the motion picture arts and
sciences. 9 The court then ruled that, although there
was no express restriction on use or distribution of
the Oscar before 1941, these restrictions were im-
plied.10 Neither the Academy nor a recipient has
ever offered to transfer the Oscar to the general
public, recipients are not allowed to sell or distrib-
ute their Oscars, and recipients are not free to make
copies of the Oscar and distribute them. The Acad-
emy did not sell or profit from this award. Under
the White test, this was a limited publication that
did not divest the Oscar of its common law protec-
tion."'
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the issue of fed-
eral trademark infringement under the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. T 1125(a).12 Under this section, "the
ultimate test is whether the public is likely to be
deceived or confused by the similarity of the
marks."13 The district court found no violation and
misapplied a six-factor test including- (1) strength
of the mark; (2) similarity in appearance; (3) class
of goods; (4) marketing channels; (5) evidence of
actual confusion; and, (6) the defendant's mitent.14
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